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Abstract
I investigate monetary policy transmission under the Trilemma across
Advanced and Emerging Market Economies, paying particular attention
on the extent of spillovers under intermediate exchange rate regimes (i.e.
managed floats). The extent of monetary pass-through: 1) is broadly
significant, but more incomplete in Emerging Markets than Advanced
Economies, 2) occurs over both the short-run and longer-run, 3) varies
within intermediate exchange rate regimes, 4) appears to be diversifi-
able under a basket peg, and 5) is non-linear in exchange rate flexibility.
The latter three points suggest that near-corner exchange rate policies
can carry starkly different implications from corner policies themselves:
Countries can face almost the same monetary autonomy as under a
float without resorting to a pure float. Countries under a fixed regime
appear to gain disproportionate monetary independence by giving up
relatively little exchange rate stability. The use of international reserves
as an additional policy instrument appears to play a role in explain-
ing these non-linearities, particularly in Emerging Markets. Such gains
in monetary autonomy are allocated towards domestic objectives dif-
ferently across Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets. Advanced
Economies tend to put greater emphasis on output stabilization while
Emerging Markets focus on inflation. Non-linear policy trade-offs under
intermediate exchange rate regimes may help explain the continuous re-
jection of the Two Corners hypothesis, the scarcity of true pure floats,
and the persistent dominance of middle-ground exchange rate policy.
∗University of Southern California, Economics Department, rashadah@usc.edu.
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1 Introduction
The international policy Trilemma (Mundell, 1963[51]) states that no coun-
try can meet all three objectives: Independent monetary policy, free capital
flows, and exchange rate stability. The importance of the theory’s impli-
cations has grown sharply amid the onset of a rapid financial globalization,
remaining an enduring topic of discussion among academics and policymakers
alike. However, research on the policy Trilemma almost exclusively focuses
on the effects of corner policy choices, (e.g. exchange rates are either con-
sidered fixed or floating). Despite the dominating presence of intermediate
exchange rate regimes around the world, we know very little about the im-
pact of middle-ground policy choices on monetary autonomy. This study
aims to address this gap in the literature.
Klein and Shambaugh (2015)[45] do consider intermediate exchange rate
regimes as a class of their own, reporting that intermediate regimes buy some
monetary autonomy relative to fixed exchange rates. However, the the study
does not consider heterogeneity within intermediate exchange rate regimes.
Given the wide spectrum of intermediate peg intensities, this is an overly
constraining restriction. Specifically, whether monetary policy spillovers are
linearly, or non-linearly related to exchange rate policy remains an open ques-
tion requiring greater detail on peg flexibility/intensity within the class of
intermediate exchange rate regimes.
On the other hand, Aizenman et al. (2010[2], (2013[4]) and Ito and Kawai
(2014)[39] investigate the Trilemma middle-ground under a continuous policy
setting, but rather than focusing on monetary policy spillovers, they focus on
macroeconomic implications and determinants of such middle-ground policy
configurations (Aizenman and Ito, 2014[6], Frankel et al., 2019[24] and Ob-
stfeld et al., 2019[53]).
The closest study related to this paper is Herwartz and Roestel (2017)[36],
where the authors study monetary spillovers in a sample of Advanced Economies,
using the standard deviation of exchange rate changes as a continuous proxy
for exchange rate regime. I build on previous works by considering a much
larger panel of countries across both Advanced Economies and Emerging
Markets, while also introducing a continuous, de facto measure of exchange
rate regime which draws on the literature related to estimating currency
zones1.
1Hall (1991)[32] and Frankel and Wei (1992)[28].
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I investigate monetary policy transmission under the Trilemma across
Advanced and Emerging Market Economies, paying particular attention on
the role of middle-ground policies. With that in mind, the literature is ex-
tended in several ways. I apply a methodological technique motivated by
Haldane and Hall (1991)[32] and Frankel and Wei (1992)[28] to estimate
monetary policy spillovers under a continuous measure of de facto exchange
rate regime. This enables exchange rate regimes to be classified at a suf-
ficiently fine level to overcome the constraining assumption of treating all
intermediate exchange rate regimes identically. Moreover, I explore poten-
tial non-linearities in monetary policy spillovers (e.g. Does a some exchange
rate flexibility buy a lot of monetary autonomy?). Monetary pass-through
from the U.S. and E.U. can be tested jointly under this framework, an im-
portant extension for informing basket peg policies.
I document significant evidence of monetary policy pass-through condi-
tional on greater financial openness and greater exchange rate rigidity. The
extent of monetary pass-through from the U.S and E.U. 1) is broadly sig-
nificant, but stronger for Advanced Economies than Emerging Markets, 2)
occurs over both the short-run and longer-run, 3) varies within intermediate
exchange rate regimes, 4) appears to be diversifiable under a basket peg, and
5) is non-linear in exchange rate flexibility. These results are generally robust
to using different definitions of exchange rate flexibility, whether monetary
spillovers are measured with actual interest rate changes or unanticipated
shocks, and the effects are not driven by the Global Financial Crisis period.
The latter three points suggest that the intensive margin of exchange rate
regimes matter - peg intensity influences monetary pass-through even upon
moving away from corner policy choices. Moreover, monetary autonomy
is non-linear in exchange rate flexibility. When facing U.S. monetary policy
shocks in particular, intermediate exchange rate regimes are not all the same:
near-corner policies can carry starkly different implications from corner poli-
cies themselves. In both Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets, the
evidence suggests that countries can achieve almost the same monetary au-
tonomy as a float without resorting to a pure float. Countries under a fixed
regime can also gain disproportionate monetary independence by sacrificing
relatively little exchange rate stability.
Such gains in monetary autonomy are allocated differently across Ad-
vanced Economies and Emerging Markets. Advanced Economies tend to put
greater emphasis on output stabilization while Emerging Markets focus on
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inflation. However, Emerging Market monetary policy also becomes increas-
ingly vulnerable global financial shocks as they move towards more flexible
exchange rates.
Two possible mechanisms which enable non-linear Trilemma trade offs
are explored: The role of international reserves and limits to international
arbitrage. The data supports the former, as I find countries tend to sig-
nificantly expend international reserves in response to U.S. monetary policy
shocks, and the reduction is larger under greater exchange rate rigidity, and
more pronounced for intermediate pegs. Managing reserves to stabilize the
exchange rate without necessarily losing monetary autonomy allows countries
to ’lean against’ the Trilemma constraint. The effects are particularly pro-
nounced among Emerging Markets- the group of countries exhibiting more
non-linearity between the Trilemma trade offs. I also test whether costly
arbitrage may weaken monetary spillovers when interest rate differentials are
sufficiently small. The evidence supporting this mechanism is relatively weak.
These favorable features of intermediate exchange rate regimes under the
context of Trilemma trade-offs may help explain the continuous rejection of
the Two Corners hypothesis, the scarcity of true pure floats, and the domi-
nance of middle-ground exchange rate policy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 survey
the relevant literature on the international policy Trilemma and intermediate
exchange rate regimes, respectively. Section 4 briefly goes over the data. Sec-
tion 5 discusses measurement and estimation of continuous de facto exchange
rate regimes. Section 6 goes on to discuss notable trends and statistics in de
facto exchange rate regimes across countries over the last two decades. Sec-
tion 7 covers the baseline empirical strategy for analyzing monetary policy
transmission under the policy Trilemma. Section 8 then goes over baseline
results. Section 9 compares short-run versus long-run transmission of mon-
etary policy. Section 10 pays particular focus on potential non-linear mon-
etary policy spillovers under intermediate exchange rate regimes. Sections
11, 12, 13 cover robustness tests: using different measure of exchange rate
regime, using exogenous U.S. monetary policy shocks around FOMC events,
and omitting the 2008 Global Financial Crisis period, respectively. Section
14 concludes.
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2 The International Policy Trilemma
The international policy Trilemma (Mundell, 1963[51]) states that no coun-
try can meet all three objectives: Independent monetary policy, free capital
flows, and exchange rate stability. The importance of the theory’s implica-
tions has grown sharply amid the onset of a rapid financial globalization,
remaining an enduring topic of discussion among academics and policymak-
ers alike.
A growing body of evidence suggests that the Trilemma generally holds
in the short and long-run: Conditional on open capital flows, international
transmission of monetary policy from base countries tends to be stronger
under fixed exchange rates than under floating (Shambaugh, 2004[57], Ob-
stfeld et al., 2005[54], Miniane and Rogers, 2007[49], Klein and Shambaugh,
2015[45], Herwartz and Roestel, 2017[36], Eichengreen, 2018[16], Han and
Wei, 2018[34] )2. Typical estimates of monetary pass-through suggest that
transmission is incomplete (i.e. less than 1-for-1) and even less so for Emerg-
ing Markets. However, Bluedorn and Bowdler (2010)[10] document that the
unanticipated component of base country monetary policy changes tend to
fully pass-through.
A related literature argues that the the effects of Trilemma policies go
beyond monetary policy, bearing consequences for macroeconomic perfor-
mance. Jorda et al. (2015)[42], Aizenman et al. (2016)[3], Frankel et al.
(2019)[24] and Obstfeld et al. (2019)[53] document that Trilemma policies,
and particularly the exchange rate regime, can explain not just the extent of
monetary policy spillovers, but also the extent of (or insulation from) inter-
national financial shocks to domestic outcomes like the volatility of inflation,
output, credit growth and asset prices.
Despite the extensive and active literature on the policy Trilemma, it
largely emphasizes corner policy choices, leaving the implications associated
with middle ground policies inconclusive. This is particularly surprising given
that the majority of countries chose to administer exchange rate policy some-
2In contrast, a number of studies debate that the Trilemma has broken down to a
’Dilemma’, rendering exchange rate policy irrelevant for monetary independence due to
several reasons related to financial globalization (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002[12], Frankel et
al., 2004[26], Rey, 2015[56], Agrippino and Rey, 2015[50], Giorgiadis and Zhu, 2019[30]).
However, Klein and Shambaugh, (2015)[45] and Han and Wei (2018)[34] specifically con-
sider these factors and still find that monetary policy pass-through to foreign interest rates
is significantly stronger (weaker) under fixed (floating) exchange rate regimes.
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where in between fixed and floating.
3 Intermediate Exchange Rate Regimes
The Two-Corners Hypothesis gained popularity after the late 90’s early
2000’s chain of financial crises experienced across the world. The argument
is that middle ground exchange rate regimes are unstable and crisis prone,
therefore exchange rate policy should converge to either fixed or floating
(Frankel et al., 2000[25]). However, empirically this hypothesis has been
continuously rejected, as middle-ground exchange rate policies are alive and
well (Fischer, 2001[20], Masson, 2001[47], Williamson (2002)[60], Frankel,
2019[22], Frankel et al. (2019)[24]). Most of the world follows an inter-
mediate exchange rate regime. As of 2018, 46.6% of the 189 IMF member
countries report administering intermediate pegs - up from 40% in 20103.
In addition, extensive empirical evidence suggests that many of the world’s
floating exchange rates are actually managed floats - i.e., intermediate pegs
of varying flexibility. Calvo and Reinhart (2002)[12] and Ilzetzki et al.
(2019)[37] both highlight the systematic ’Fear of Floating’ exhibited by ex-
change rates of countries which presumably claim to float, despite pervasive
contradicting evidence.
Despite the overwhelming presence of intermediate exchange rate regimes
along a wide spectrum of flexibility, little is known about why they persist
or more specifically, their role in the international transmission of monetary
policy. This paper aims to address this gap in the literature.
4 Data
I consider a panel composed of 46 countries which does not include the U.S.
and E.U. countries over the period Q1 2000 to Q4 2018 (quarterly frequency).
12 are Advanced Economies and 34 are Emerging Markets. The data was
collected from multiple sources.
Quarterly central bank policy interest rates are taken from the BIS and
IMF IFS database4. Nominal GDP, Inflation and CPI data are primarily
3Source: IMF Annual Report of Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER) for the year 2018
4Additional data on interest rates were collected from individual central bank websites
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drawn from the BIS, IMF IFS, and the World Bank. Growth rates and infla-
tion are year-over-year percentages. The Chinn-Ito index derived from the
IMF AREAER database is used as a measure of financial openness5. Val-
ues are normalized to range between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates completely
open capital flow. The index is annual, thus I repeat annual values over each
quarter within the year.
Daily exchange rates are from the BIS and are used to estimate de-facto
exchange rate peg intensity at the quarterly frequency. Moreover, daily log
returns are aggregated to the quarterly frequency, and combined with in-
flation data to construct quarterly real exchange rate returns. A positive
change in the real exchange rate corresponds to local depreciation against
the USD.
Data on the CBOE VIX index, a common gauge for global risk appetite,
are from FRED. I remove country-quarter observations which are deemed
outliers based on: Interest rate changes greater than 5 percentage points in
absolute value, interest rate levels greater than 50%, and inflation greater
than 40%6. Additional data detail can be found in the Data Detail, Section
15.
5 De-Facto Peg Intensities
A key limitation across studies on the policy Trilemma is the course classifi-
cation of exchange rate regimes. Most studies resort to a binary splitting of
observations into either ’floating’ or ’fixed’ exchange rate regimes. While this
is an important consideration when focusing on the corner configurations of
the policy trilemma, little can be said about the monetary autonomy trade-off
under more complex exchange rate targeting policy, such as an intermediate
peg or basket peg. Moreover, intermediate exchange rate regimes are not all
equal: policymakers choose the degree of flexibility which potentially gives
way to a spectrum of exchange rate regimes (peg intensities) which vary both
across countries and over time.
As a parsimonious solution for estimating a continuous measure of the de-
facto exchange rate regime, I follow the methodology introduced in Haldane
and Global Financial Data. When official central bank policy rates could not be used,
short-term treasury bills, repos, or discount rates are used.
5Chinn and Ito (2006)[13].
6Comparable to Ilzetzki et al. (2019)[37].
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and Hall (1991)[32], Frankel and Wei (1992)[28], and later on in Benassy-
Quere et al. (2006)[9]. This regression-based technique estimates continuous
’peg intensities’ that are directly associated with a base currency7. The first-
step here is to estimate non-overlapping de-facto peg intensities at the quar-
terly frequency. Then these estimates characterizing a country’s exchange
rate regime can be used in the main analysis testing for monetary policy
transmission.
Like Haldane and Hall (1991)[32] I use daily exchange rate data which
yields a sufficient number of observations for consistent quarterly peg inten-
sity estimates. However at the daily frequency the issue of asynchronous
trading hours across international exchange rate markets might pollute the
regression analysis. One solution would be to use weekly exchange rates
(Frankel and Wei, 1992[28] and McCauley and Chan, 2014[48]), but the num-
ber of observations to estimate quarterly peg intensities would drop drasti-
cally. To overcome the issue of potential non-overlapping trading hours while
preserving the number of observations, I compute 2-day rolling average ex-
change rate returns as done in Forbes and Rigobon (2002)[21] and Wang et
al. (2017)[59]. Then over each quarter, I estimate the following regression:
∆eit = αi +W
e
i ∆e
e
t +W
U
i ∆e
U
t +W
$
i ∆e
$
t + ǫit, (1)
where ∆eit is the change in the log exchange rate of country i vis-a-vis
the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights currency basket (SDR) and base curren-
cies on the RHS, ∆eht , h ∈ {e,U, $}, are the Euro, Japanese Yen, and U.S.
Dollar vis-a-vis the SDR, respectively. I choose these three currencies as the
possible set of base currencies because of their disproportionately large role
in international trade and finance. The U.S. Dollar and the Euro together
make up the large majority of: base currency pegs, international reserves
holdings, external debt currency denomination, and trade invoicing currency
globally8. Note that the question of which numeraire to use is discussed ex-
tensively in the literature as it affects the interpretation of the error term
when the currency does not follow a perfect hard peg9. To circumvent this
7Variants of this methodology have been recently implemented in McCauley and Chan
(2014)[48], Ito and Kawai (2016)[40] and Ito and McCauley (2019)[41] to study cross-
country patterns in trade invoicing currencies, global imbalances and the composition
of central bank foreign reserves. Frankel et al. (2019)[24] consider continuous de facto
exchange rate regimes to study their effects on economic growth.
8See [31] and [11].
9Additionally, if the numeraire moves closely in line with one of the candidate base
currencies, then that base currency will have very small variance and may be confused
with the constant term (Benassy-Quere et al., 2006[9]).
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issue, I use SDRs as the numeraire (Frankel and Wei, 1993[29]10).
Equation 1 implies that the movements of each currency i are decomposed
to a weighted average of the base currencies plus an idiosyncratic error term.
These weights translate to peg intensities against base currencies. For exam-
ple, with a currency that pegs perfectly to the U.S. Dollar (e.g. Hong Kong),
W $i would equal 1 and the other weights would equal zero. In contrast, a
purely floating exchange rate would have weights statistically indifferent from
zero across all three base currencies, and an exchange rate which targets a
basket (e.g. Singapore) would have non-zero weights on multiple base cur-
rencies. Therefore, the strength of the peg is given by a value between 0 and
1, where 0 is no weight (float), and a 1 is interpreted as a hard peg to the
base currency. This way we arrive at a continuous measure of peg intensity
for each country, for each quarter11.
6 Trends in Exchange Rate Policy
I estimate peg intensities for a sample of 52 currencies against the U.S. Dol-
lar, Euro, and Japanese Yen (Tables 16 and 17). Because of the broadly low
peg levels against the Yen, I focus on the cross-country dynamics of USD and
EUR peg intensities. Figure 1 shows percentages of countries falling into each
exchange rate classification over the 2000-2018 period. Floats, intermediates
and pegs are defined as peg intensity estimates Wˆ bit ∈ {[0, .1], (.1, .9], (.9, 1]},
respectively. 4-quarter averages are plotted for clarity. A striking consis-
tency is how persistent the proportion of intermediate exchange rate regimes
have been over the past two decades across both base currencies, particularly
the USD. Roughly a third of the sample follows an intermediate peg at any
given period. Moreover, the proportion of countries floating against the USD
nearly doubled from 20% in 2000 to 40% by 2018. This trend was driven by
10Other solutions have been proposed: Frankel et al. (2001)[23] use a basket of currencies
not unlike the SDR and Frankel (1993)[27] use consumer price indices as the numeraire.
Ma and McCauley (2011) demonstrate that the results from Frankel and Wei (1993)[29]
do not vary by much under either SDR or the U.S. Dollar as the numeraire.
11I follow the algorithm of Ito and McCauley (2019)[41] to clean and remove spurious
estimation results: I remove daily exchange rate changes of greater than 5% to prevent
crisis-related outliers from influencing peg intensities (Ilzetzki et al., 2019[37] similarly
remove inflation greater than 40% in their analysis). Any statistically significant negative
coefficient estimate is set to be a missing value. Statistically insignificant negative values
are set to zero. Values statistically significantly greater than one are taken to be missing
values, and values insignificantly greater than 1 are set to 1.
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countries transitioning away from a hard USD peg, rather than intermediate
pegs becoming more flexible.
Figure 1: Exchange Rate Regimes Across Coun-
tries, vis-a-vis USD (left), EUR (right)
Floats, intermediates and pegs are defined as peg intensity estimates
Wˆ b
it
∈ {[0, .1], (.1, .9], (.9, 1]}, respectively. Rolling 4-quarter averages.
A striking statistic in the data is the number and proportion of actual
pure floats across the sample (Figure 2). In 2000, the only currency which had
estimated peg intensities of less than or equal to 0.20 against all three base
currencies was the British Pound. Including the three base currencies, that
amounts to just four pure floats at the turn of the century. Proportionately,
it is clear from the figure that pure floating currencies are historically scarce
and continue to be so. In 2018, the number rose to ten, including USD, EUR
and JPY. Brunei and Singapore (which are pegged to each other), the Chi-
nese Yuan, Korean Won, Thai Baht, Canadian Dollar and British Pound.
The Emerging Market cases are of particular interest: The currencies of
Brunei and Singapore are officially pegged to each other. Throughout 2018,
the Thai Baht / Singapore Dollar exchange rate was exceptionally stable,
suggesting that Thailand was likely de facto targeting vis-a-vis the SGD.
Singapore itself has realized steady gains in exchange rate flexibility over the
past two decades. The Chinese Yuan saw its peg intensity to the USD weaken
dramatically since 2016 amidst rising trade tensions between China and the
United States. South Korea has been under an Inflation Targeting monetary
regime sine the early 2000’s. If Brunei and Thailand are omitted, and the
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case of China is considered transient, that leaves just 6 currencies under a
truly pure float in 2018, with Singapore being a new, notable independent
floater.
Figure 2: Sample Proportion of ’Pure’ Floaters,
2000-2018
I define a currency as a pure floater in any particular quarter if all three weights, Wˆ b
it
where, b ∈ {USD, EUR, JPY}, are estimated to be less than 0.20. Rolling 4-quarter
average of Wˆ b
it
is used. Total sample contains 55 countries; number is inclusive of USD,
EUR, and JPY.
Figure 3 sorts peg intensities from lowest to highest across countries, for
the year 2000 and 201812. The number of hard U.S. pegs (intensity greaater
than 0.90) have fallen drastically over the past two decades, while the number
of floaters rose. In contrast, peg intensities against the EUR have risen over
the past 20 years13. Moreover, the number of countries under intermediate
pegs remains substantial in 2018 (roughly 60% of the sample considering both
USD and EUR), and the ’intensity curves’ are relatively smooth - highlight-
ing the importance of considering intermediate pegs across a broad spectrum.
Figure 4 in the appendix plots peg intensity transitions currency-by-currency.
Against the USD, many countries which were hard pegs in 2000 have relaxed
their policy by 2018, most of them following de facto intermediate policies.
At the same time, most countries did increase the pegging weight attributed
12The plotted intensities are 4-quarter averages)
13Ito and McCauley (2019)[41] attribute this partly to commodity currencies moving
away from the pure U.S. Dollar zone to a more intermediate position between the Dollar
and Euro.
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Figure 3: Peg intensities in 2000 vs 2018, vis-a-vis
USD (left), EUR (right)
Annual 2000 and 2018 estimates of Wˆ b
it
are 4-quarter averages.
to the EUR.
An important possibility to consider is whether countries which moved
away from the USD are switching to EUR as a base currency to peg against.
The estimated correlation between 2000-2018 changes in USD peg intensities
and 2000-2018 changes in EUR peg intensities is equal to -0.23 (t=-1.64) but
not highly significant in the statistical sense. The weak negative correlation
implies that changes in USD peg intensity can explain roughly 5% of the
variation in changes in EUR peg intensity. The evidence, therefore suggests
that base currency substitution was not a major factor driving transitions in
exchange rate policy.
Figures 6 in the Appendix shows changes in peg intensity by currency.
Focusing on USD pegs, Romania, South Korea, China, Brazil, Mexico, and
Thailand round out the countries exhibiting the largest changes. Over this
time period, Romania transitioned from a hard peg to the USD to targeting
the EUR, explaining the near-maximal drop in USD peg intensity coinciding
with a large rise in EUR peg intensity. In 2015, China begun transitioning
from a hard de facto USD peg amidst the country’s push to globalize it’s
currency, while the other countries are notable Emerging Markets that have
adopted Inflation Targeting monetary policy over the period, thereby allow-
ing market forces to increasingly drive their currency movements.
Taking a look at exchange rate intensities over time, I plot 4-quarter
11
Figure 4: Change in Peg Intensity from 2000 to
2018
Annual 2000 and 2018 estimates of Wˆ b
it
are 4-quarter averages.
rolling average USD and EUR intensities for select countries in Figure 7 and
aggregate, cross-country averages in Figure 8. Romania’s early-2000’s tran-
sition from a USD peg to a EUR peg becomes clear. Singapore has steadily
reduced it’s peg against the USD to nearly zero, through for a large part
of the 2000’s the country seems to have targeted a basket with partial pegs
against both the EUR and USD.
Switzerland had a strong yet imperfect peg against the EUR over most
of the sample period, though the EUR peg intensity dropped considerably
during the 2011 European Debt Crisis, then returning to high levels until
Switzerland surprised the world with their sudden re-valuation in January
2015 where the Franc appreciated roughly 30% against the Euro. Since then,
the peg intensity has continued to steadily weaken. China’s hard peg to the
USD is very apparent in the early 2000’s (despite the government claiming
to target a basket). The country continued to administer a strong (though
not perfect) USD peg up until Q4 2015, and since then - the USD peg inten-
sity has dropped sharply amidst the country’s push towards introducing the
Yuan as a global currency to less than 0.10, and this drop is not substituted
with increased EUR intensity14.
Overall trends in USD and EUR peg intensities across all countries in
the sample are shown in Figure 8. What is clear is that the average USD
14It is also possible that this sharp drop in China’s targeting the USD was driven by
the U.S.-China trade war in an effort to insulate against the effects of tariffs.
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peg intensity has crept lower steadily over the past 20 years (from over 0.60
to below 0.45), with the exception of 2011 during the European Debt Cri-
sis where a sharp rise in USD peg intensity appears to have been driven by
countries substituting away from targeting the EUR, which realized a coin-
ciding sharp drop in intensity. Moreover the persistent rise of intermediate
pegs accompanying a persistent scarcity of pure floats are not supportive of
the Two Corners hypothesis, and highlight the importance of better under-
standing middle-ground policies.
The question of what might determine a country’s choice of exchange
rate policy is a natural (extensively-studied) follow-up. Many potential fac-
tors might drive this choice. For example, Edwards (1996)[15] finds that
political economy factors play a major role, as the choice of between fixed
and floating is related to the country’s historical degree of political instabil-
ity, the probability of abandoning a pegged rate, the policy objectives of the
domestic monetary authorities. Devereaux and Engel (1998)[14] argue that
what matters is whether prices are set in the currency of the consumer or
producer. Recent studies also consider the choice of operating an interme-
diate exchange rate regime. Ito and Kawai (2014)[39] suggest that countries
opt for more flexible exchange rate regimes when the country has: greater in-
ternational reserves, more trading partners, a lower proportion of commodity
exports, and greater domestic savings, while McCauley and Chan (2014)[48]
report that the composition of foreign exchange reserves strongly explains
cross-country variation in (continuous measures of) exchange rate peg inten-
sities.
Armed with continuous peg intensities against the USD and EUR, the
two globally dominant base currencies, one can effectively measure monetary
policy spillovers with finer granularity. That is, we can shift our attention
from the corners of exchange rate policy to interior choices, i.e. intermediate
regimes. The following analysis leverages these estimated peg intensities to
study whether and to what degree monetary policy spillovers are consistent
with the Trilemma, particularly under intermediate pegs.
7 Testing the Trilemma: Empirical Strategy
There are a number for steps that must be taken before arriving that the
final econometric specification to test monetary policy spillovers. For illus-
trative purposes, consider a modified Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP)
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condition which allows for both open and closed capital flow regimes:
Rit = (1− τit)(Rbit + Et[∆eib,t+1] + ρit) + τitR
∗
it, τit ∈ {0, 1}, (2)
where whether country i administers closed (open) capital flow is given
by τit: a value of 0 for open and 1 if closed. Under free capital flow (τit = 1),
the interest rate of country i, Rit should equal the interest rate of the base
country, Rbit plus the expected percent appreciation of base country b’s cur-
rency vis-a-vis country i’s currency denoted Et[∆eib,t+1] , plus a risk premium
ρit. Under a perfectly credible hard peg, Et[∆eib,t+1] equals zero. So under a
hard peg and assuming a zero risk premium and τ = 0, its easy to see that
Rit = Rbit. That is, country i does not have any monetary autonomy as the
base country interest rate fully passes through. In contrast, under a flexible
exchange rate and/or time-varying risk premia, Rit can indeed deviate from
the base country interest rate. The Trilemma implies that limiting capital
flows by introducing capital controls can reduce this policy pass-through and
grant greater monetary autonomy. This is shown in Equation 2 under τit = 1.
Under a closed capital account, UIP no longer applies and country i’s interest
rate is fully independent, Rit = R
∗
it.
A major simplifying assumption of the illustration just presented is that
exchange rates can be either fixed or floating, and capital controls can either
be open or closed. Despite this unrealistic assumption, most studies on the
policy Trilemma are restricted to such cases. By leveraging continuous mea-
sures of peg intensity, I aim to relax this assumption. Second, interest rate
levels tend to be very persistent, thus raising the issue of potential unit roots
and spurious regression results. Therefore, following the literature, we test
the for monetary pass-through using interest rate changes. Third, as in Han
and Wei (2018)[34], it is important to condition interest rates on domestic
variables which the central bank may target as we wish to capture interest
rate changes exclusively driven by the Trilemma and remove bias driven by
policy responses to domestic economic conditions. Additionally, it is crucial
to condition base country interest rates on domestic variables (Jorda et al.,
2019[61]) to identify unanticipated base country monetary policy shocks. In
addition to the baseline analysis, in Section 12 I test monetary spillovers using
unanticipated shocks to U.S. monetary policy around FOMC announcements.
14
7.1 Identification of Base Country Monetary Shocks
The base interest rates under consideration are the U.S. and E.U. (ECB)
policy interest rates, b ∈ {U.S., E.U.}15. A key identifying assumption here
and in the broad majority of related studies is that all other countries take
changes in U.S. and E.U. monetary policy as exogenous. That is, country
i’s economic condition does not factor into monetary policy decisions for the
U.S. and E.U., whereas domestic conditions strictly determine the interest
rate. Though plausible, this assumption may or may not be reasonably sat-
isfied at all times. Therefore, as a robustness check I also consider a measure
of unanticipated U.S. monetary policy shocks later in Section 12.
To remove potential endogeneity arising from policy changes driven by
domestic economic conditions, instead of using interest rate changes directly,
I first run the following Taylor Rule regression:
∆Rbit = αb+β1∆ybit+β2∆ybitDb,ZLB +β3∆πbit+β4∆πbitDb,ZLB +Zbit, (3)
where ∆Rbit is the quarterly change (now t reflects quarters) in interest
rate for base country b, in this case either the U.S. or E.U. ∆ybit and ∆πbit
are year-over-year GDP growth and inflation, respectively. Because of the
drastic change in monetary policy after hitting the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB),
I allow for the Taylor Rule coefficients to change conditional on base coun-
try interest rates hitting their effective lower bounds. This is captured by a
Dummy variable, Db,ZLB which takes a value of 1 if base country b’s policy
rate is at the effective lower bound, and 0 otherwise. The estimated residual
policy rate change Zˆbit ∈ {ZˆUS,t, ZˆEU,t} - cleaned of domestic confounders -
is then a measure of base country monetary policy changes that are uncor-
related with domestic economic conditions.
The second step required for identification is motivated by Jorda et al.
(2015, 2019)[42][61], and more generally consistent with the broader litera-
ture on the policy Trilemma. That is, the effect of base country b’s monetary
policy shock on country i’s interest rate depends on: country i’s peg intensity
with respect to the base currency of country b given by Wˆ bit, and country i’s
capital account openness, Kit. Both of these variables lie within [0, 1], where
0 indicates fully floating exchange rate/closed capital accounts, and 1 indi-
cates fully pegged exchange rate and full capital openness. Taken together,
15These two countries make up the lions share of globally held international reserves,
and currency pegs
15
the variable of interest in the baseline regression specification will be the in-
teraction term Zˆbit×Wˆ
b
it×Kit. The key difference between this measure and
prevailing studies is that here, the variable measuring exchange rate regime,
Wˆ bit is continuous and lies within [0, 1]
16. Importantly, the identification as-
sumption that must be satisfied is monotonicity:
∂E[∆Rit|x]
∂[Zˆbit × Wˆ bit ×Kit]
≥ 0. (4)
What the assumption requires is that the change in country i’s interest
rate (conditional on controls, x), is increasing in the denominator. Think
of peg intensity and capital openness as measures of how exposed country
i’s interest rate is to the base country’s, and we ideally, wish to compare
two identical countries in terms of fundamentals and capital controls, but
varying in exchange rate flexibility. For zero exposure, either Wˆ bit or Kit
must equal zero. That is, the country must administer either a pure float,
or close capital controls for complete monetary autonomy - precisely what
the Trilemma implies. Conversely, exposure to the base country’s monetary
policy is conditionally maximized when either Wˆ bit or Kit is equal to 1; when
country i administers either a hard peg or free capital flow.
7.2 Econometric Specification
The baseline regression to be tested is:
∆Rit = αi + φ1∆Ri,t−1 + φ2∆yit + φ3∆πit + φ4∆RERit
+ φ5∆V IXt + φ6∆R¯t
+ γUS[ZˆUS,t × Wˆ
$
it ×Kit] + γEU [ZˆEU,t × Wˆ
e
it ×Kit] + ǫit. (5)
The baseline regression assumes that country i follows an open econ-
omy Taylor Rule (Aizenman et al., 2011[5] and Engel, 2011[18], Han and
Wei (2014, 2018)[33][34]) and conditions on key domestic variables which
may influence changes in the policy rate. Changes in country i’s policy rate
are regressed on lagged policy rates17 ∆Ri,t−1, nominal GDP growth ∆yit,
16Jorda et al. (2015)[42] defines exogenous monetary policy shocks in the same way -
as the interaction of the base country’s monetary policy change, the exchange rate regime
and degree of capital openness - but using binary measures of exchange rate regimes.
17The specification taking the form of a dynamic panel model is well known to suffer from
Nickell (1981)[52] bias when the time dimension is small. However, our quarterly sample
provides T ranging from mid-40 to mid-70 depending on the sub-sample and country.
Judson and Owen (1999)[43] show through Monte-Carlo studies that the LSDV estimator
performs well in comparison with GMM and other estimators when T=30.
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changes in inflation ∆πit, and changes in the log real exchange rate ∆RERit
vis-a-vis the USD. Positive changes in the real exchange rate indicate country
i depreciation. Including the real exchange rate also will capture any possible
evidence of Fear of Floating, one phenomena which challenges the sustain-
ability of the Trilemma (Calvo and Reinhart (2002)[12]). Additionally the
validity of the Trilemma has been actively debated in light of new evidence of
a global financial cycle (Agrippino and Rey, 2015[50], Rey, 2015[56]), hence
the specification also controls for global factors: log changes in the VIX in-
dex given by ∆V IXt, and ∆R¯t which denotes changes in the global average
interest rate.
The final two terms preceding the residual ǫit of Equation 5 are the focus
of this study. Coefficients γUS and γEU capture the degree of spillover from
base interest rates (U.S. monetary policy and ECB monetary policy, respec-
tively) to country i’s interest rate. Given a foreign monetary policy shock to
the base country, Zˆbt, the total spillover to country i is an increasing function
of peg intensity and capital account openness, γb[Wˆ bit ×Kit]
18.
A potential drawback of the regression specification is the imposed ho-
mogeneity of coefficients across countries. For example, weights on Taylor
Rule coefficients might differ across countries which aim to prioritize differ-
ent policy objectives: Emerging Markets may prioritize targeting the real
exchange rate, while this may not be an objective at all among some Ad-
vanced Economies (Aizenman, 2011[5] and Ahmed et al., 2019[1]). Despite
this limitation, much of the literature stands by the pooled panel regres-
sion specification as it buys considerable statistical power when dealing with
cross-country panels19. In support of homogeneous coefficients restriction,
Han and Wei (2018)[34] find that after estimating country-specific Taylor
Rules, weights assigned to inflation for Inflation Targeting countries and
non-Inflation Targeting countries are not statistically different. However to
account for potential heterogeneity in regression coefficients, I estimate the
regression on Developed and Emerging Market sub samples of countries along
with the full sample. Moreover in Section 10 I allow the coefficients to be
estimated separately for each sub-group, reflecting the possibility that coun-
tries with greater monetary autonomy under a flexible exchange rate can put
more weight on domestic policy objectives compared to countries adminis-
18Ito and Kawai (2012, 2014)[38][39] apply a similar method to estimate a country’s
monetary independence, but they do not pre-condition base country interest rates on
domestic variables or account for financial openness.
19Obstfeld et al. (2005)[54], Klein and Shambaugh (2015)[45], Han and Wei (2018)[34],
Obstfeld et al. (2019)[53] all employ the pooled specification in their baseline analysis.
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tering stronger pegs (Klein and Shambaugh, 2015[45]).
7.3 Tests and Hypotheses
The policy Trilemma assumes that γb = 1 from Equation 5. That is, un-
der a perfect peg and open capital flows (Wˆ bit = 1, Kit = 1), interest rate
pass-through should be one-for-one, while under a pure float (Wˆ bit = 0) or
closed capital flows (Kit = 0), there is no interest rate pass-through (i.e.
complete monetary autonomy). However, in practice it is difficult to expect
this assumption to hold. First, the policy Trilemma relies on UIP being sat-
isfied, but there is extensive empirical evidence of UIP being violated in the
data. Second, as Klein and Shambaugh (2015)[45] show, one cannot expect
Trilemma-consistent pass-through if country i’s interest rate changes are cor-
related with other factors that influence their policy rate such as expected
exchange rate changes, risk premia or global shocks.
Nonetheless, there are a number of valuable tests that can be conducted.
If γb is statistically significant and positive, that itself is evidence in favor
of the Trilemma despite imperfect pass-through. A positive coefficient im-
plies a statistically significant relationship between base country policy rates
and country i’s policy rates which strengthens as the exchange rate policy
becomes increasingly rigid, or as capital accounts become more open. A
continuous measure of exchange rate regime will let us infer whether inter-
mediate exchange rate regimes offer intermediate degrees monetary policy
autonomy. Different coefficient estimates of γUS and γEU suggest that mon-
etary policy spillovers are heterogenous, and may be different depending on
the base currency. Finally, a significant coefficient on both γUS and γEU sug-
gest that basket pegs can offer diversification benefits compared to a hard
peg against a single base currency as long as the base country monetary
policies are not perfectly correlated with one another. For example, a coun-
try targeting a basket of two exchange rates would be imperfectly exposed to
both monetary policies, versus being fully exposed to a single country’s mon-
etary policy. The latter two tests would bring novel insights to the literature.
A key assumption of the regression specified in Equation 5 is the implicit
linearity imposed on monetary pass-through. The effect of monetary pass-
through implied by γb[Wˆ bit×Kit] is linear in peg intensity and capital account
openness. The Trilemma trade-offs however are not necessarily required to be
linear, though have been assumed to be so in some studies (Ito and Kawai,
2014[39]). There is no consensus on the linearity of Trilemma trade-offs.
Aizenman et al. (2010)[2] test the linearity assumption and find supportive
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evidence. In contrast, Obstfeld et al. (2019)[53] find non-linear effects of
(non-monetary) spillovers under varying degrees of exchange rate flexibility.
Because of the important policy implications of (non) linearity, I explore this
issue in more detail in Section 10 by exploiting the continuous nature of peg
intensity measures.
8 Baseline Results
The results for the full sample of countries are reported in Table 6. The
three columns represent different variants of the peg intensity estimate Wˆ bit.
The second and third columns use a 2-quarter and 4-quarter rolling aver-
age of Wˆ bit, respectively denoted with (RA, 2) and (RA, 4), to replace the
unsmoothed measure (column 1). Smoothing out the peg intensity estimate
with past observations helps makes a more conservative choice to ensure that
pegs, which tend to be persistent, are well-established (Jorda et al., 2015[42],
2019[61]). Moreover, smoothing even over 2 quarters helps ensure that re-
sults are not driven by outliers and helps eliminate episodes of opportunistic
pegging and sudden short-lived devaluations. Regardless, estimates are con-
sistent and significance is broadly robust across columns.
8.1 All Countries
Significant non-zero estimates on both γˆUS and γˆEU indicate Trilemma-
consistent monetary spillovers from both base countries to others (Table
6). As peg intensity rises under free capital flows, the pass-through of base
country interest rates strengthens (weakens). Note that the effects are statis-
tically different from 1, implying imperfect Trilemma pass-through. That is,
under a perfect peg and free capital flows, a 1 percentage point change in the
base country (US, EU) interest rate is associated with interest rates roughly
(+0.36, +0.50) percentage points higher. Column 4 removes global variables
(∆V IXt and ∆R¯t) and introduces time fixed effects as a robustness check -
the effects of monetary pass-through broadly hold under this specification.
8.2 Advanced Economies
Table 7 reports estimates for the sub-sample of Advanced Economies. Both
base country Trilemma coefficients are highly significant across the varying
specifications of peg intensity and remain robust to both country and time
fixed effects. Both U.S. and E.U. base country pass-through is roughly 0.70
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for Advanced Economies, much higher than it was for the full sample. In
fact, in many instances the confidence interval includes 1 - indicative of near-
perfect monetary policy pass-through.
8.3 Emerging Markets
Table 8 reports pass-through estimates for the sub-sample of Emerging Mar-
kets. Across all four specifications, there is no evidence of significant mone-
tary policy spillovers from EUmonetary policy, despite a number of Emerging
Market economies pegging, at some point, to the Euro20. In contrast, the ef-
fect of U.S. monetary policy is statistically significant in most specifications,
ranging from 0.24 to 0.39, indicating that under a perfect peg and free cap-
ital flows, monetary spillovers from the U.S. are imperfect, with Emerging
market interest rates rising on average +0.30 percentage points for every +1
percentage point rise in U.S. interest rates.
8.4 Intermediate Pegs
Column 5 of Tables 6, 7 and 8 consider the sub-sample of country-quarter ob-
servations which do not include pure floats or hard pegs (i.e. excluding values
of 0 or 1 for Wˆ bit). This is done to verify whether corner policies are driving
the results of the regression tests, or whether the range of intermediate pegs
actually offer a spectrum of monetary autonomy. Across the full sample, the
effects of both U.S. and E.U. peg intensity remain highly significant upon
omitting corner policy observations, suggesting that the intensive margin of
peg intensity also matters for monetary policy. The Advanced Economy sub-
group signals the same message: The effects of monetary policy pass-through
hold for both the intensive and extensive margin of exchange rate regimes.
This has implications for countries which target a basket of currencies. Bas-
ket pegs can be viewed as intermediate pegs against more than one exchange
rate21. This can give rise to monetary policy exposure from multiple base
currencies, although each individual pass-through effect is smaller than it
would be under a unitary peg against any individual component of the bas-
ket (basket weights cannot exceed one).
20These countries include but are not limited to: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech
Republic, Hungary.
21For example, a peg intensity of 0.5 to both the U.S. Dollar and the Euro would qualify
as a basket peg.
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For the Emerging Market sub-group, the significance of the coefficient
estimate on γˆUS disappears when removing observations containing corner
policies (Column 5, Table 8). This may have several interpretations. One is
that across Emerging Markets, intermediate pegs may not offer intermediate
monetary autonomy, but rather disproportionately greater monetary auton-
omy than a hard peg, indicating a non-linear relationship between exchange
rate flexibility and monetary autonomy: A country which introduces a little
bit of exchange rate flexibility can potentially buy a lot of monetary indepen-
dence. There are other possible interpretations as well: For these countries,
increasing flexibility of the exchange rate might disproportionately increase
the sensitivity of monetary policy to non-Trilemma factors (domestic objec-
tives, Fear of Floating, financial cycles or commodity cycles, risk premia,
etc.). So, while the base country’s monetary policy spillovers are less influen-
tial, the costly rising importance across other external factors may offset any
benefits from monetary autonomy. In the next section, we will investigate
these non-linearities further, and allow regression coefficients to vary across
peg intensities to possibly reflect changing weights on policy objectives as
countries move from pegs to floats. Finally, in an interesting twist when con-
sidering only intermediate peg observations, monetary spillovers under the
Trilemma with regards to E.U. monetary policy becomes statistically signifi-
cant (γˆEU), implying that under intermediate peg intensities, E.U. monetary
policy passes through to countries which partially target the Euro and the
pass-through increases as the country approaches a peg. However surpris-
ingly, hard pegs to the Euro do not exhibit Trilemma-consistent monetary
spillovers.
8.5 Discussion
To summarize, significant evidence of monetary policy spillovers are present
in both Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets, but estimated mone-
tary policy pass-through is considerably stronger among Advanced Economies.
Both monetary policy spillovers and overall regression fit (R2) are lower for
the Emerging Markets sub-sample compared to Advanced Economies. This
could be due to the presence of important factors which are correlated with
country i’s interest rate. For example, monetary pass-through estimates may
be low in Emerging Markets because risk premia tend to be highly volatile
(Kalemli-Ozcan, 2019[44]). Fear of Floating and Global Financial Cycles, op-
erating through the real exchange rate and financial conditions respectively,
may also impact country i’s policy choices (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002[12] and
Rey, 2015[56]). Some Emerging Markets are heavily reliant on commodity
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trade, hence exposing themselves to commodity cycles which in turn can in-
fluence policy objectives (Aizenman et al., 2011[5]). Finally, recent evidence
suggests that the burgeoning debt positions of Emerging Markets (and Ad-
vanced Economies) brought in by unprecedented monetary easing after the
2008 Financial Crisis may be interacting with monetary policy objectives
(Ahmed et al., 2019[1]).
For the full sample, particularly Advanced Economies, there is robust ev-
idence consistent with Klein and Shambaugh (2015)[45] that the Trilemma
holds under interior policy choices (i.e. peg intensities between 0 and 1),
potentially allowing for partial monetary autonomy. Hence a key policy
implication is that basket pegs can potentially mitigate monetary policy
spillovers from a single country via a unitary peg by taking on monetary
spillovers from an additional country, effectively diversifying spillover risk.
Interestingly, Emerging Markets do not seem to exhibit Trilemma-consistent
monetary policy spillovers under intermediate pegs. However, this may imply
that among these countries, moving from a hard peg to an intermediate peg
buys a disproportionate amount of monetary independence - either uncondi-
tionally or relatively by assigning greater weight on other policy objectives.
Potential non-linearities in the exchange rate regime - monetary spillover
function are explored in the next section.
9 Long-Run Monetary Policy Adjustment
In the previous section its shown that the link between base country interest
rates and country i strengthens in peg intensity, for a given capital open-
ness. The specification focuses on short-run associations, while Shambaugh
(2004)[57] highlight the possibility of long-run adjustment in the policy rate
which might depend on the Trilemma configuration. That is, even if policy
rates across countries respond immediately to one another, it’s also possible
for country i’s interest rate to be increasingly cointegrated with the base
country’s interest rate as peg intensity rises - so interest rate adjustment oc-
curs over both the short-run and over a longer period of time22. To test for
this, I extend Equation 5 to include two error-correcting terms: A cointegrat-
ing vector between country i’s interest rate and the base country (U.S. and
E.U. interest rates, respectively), interacted with peg intensity and capital
openness:
22This could be due to various financial market imperfections or practical limits to
arbitrage.
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(ri,t−1 − Cbrb,t−1)× Wˆ
b
i,t−1 ×Ki,t−1. (6)
Typically one estimates Cb in a first-stage, but I pre-set Cb = 1, effec-
tively defining the cointegrating vector as the interest rate differential be-
tween country i and base country b23. A negative coefficient on this term
implies that when country i’s interest rate exceeds the base country’s, it will
induce adjustment in the policy rate to catch down to the base country’s.
The interaction with peg intensity allows the rate of reversion to strengthen
with peg intensity as expected undre the policy Trilemma. The interaction
with capital openness allows for comparison across countries with identical
openness yet differing peg intensities.
Table 1: Short vs. Long-run Monetary Spillovers
Dep. Variable All Advanced Emerging
∆rit Countries Economies Markets
γˆUS 0.370*** 0.783*** 0.248**
(0.122) (0.199) (0.121)
γˆEU 0.403*** 0.684*** 0.165
(0.144) (0.120) ( 0.241)
(ri,t−1 − rUS,t−1)× Wˆ
US
i,t−1 ×Ki,t−1 -0.021** -0.035 -0.023**
( 0.010) (0.025) (0.011)
(ri,t−1 − rEU,t−1)× Wˆ
EU
i,t−1 ×Ki,t−1 -0.055* 0.001 -0.061*
(0.031) (0.031) (0.034)
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at the Country level. Estimation period: Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Peg
intensity used: Wˆ b
it
(RA, 2).
Table 1 reports long-run spillover effects24. Short run estimates are in-
cluded to verify that they are not sensitive to the inclusion of error-correction
terms. Across the sample, there is evidence of longer-run adjustment in coun-
try i’s interest rate to both base countries - E.U. and U.S. which increases
23Constraining the cointegrating vector to the interest rate differential by setting Cb = 1
is theoretically consistent with UIP and also reduces bias that would otherwise arise from
the error-in-variables issues with first-stage estimation.
24Robust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification of
Equation 5 plus error correction terms (Equation 6). Estimation period: Q2 2000 - Q4
2018. Peg intensity used: Wˆ b
it
(RA, 2).
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in country i’s peg intensity to either base country. The negative coefficient
sign is theoretically consistent: When the interest rate differential is positive
(negative), country i’s policy rate adjusts in the direction of the base coun-
try interest rate. When stratifying the sample into Advanced and Emerging
Market economies, it’s the Emerging Markets which exhibit evidence of sta-
tistically significant error-correction in their policy rates under both U.S.
and E.U. pegs, while Advanced Economies generally only exhibit evidence
of strong short-run monetary spillovers. If the sample is limited to only
intermediate pegs (Wˆ bit ∈ (0, 1)), the long-run effect against EU peg inten-
sity turns significant at the 1% level while the long-run effect vis-a-vis the
U.S. turns insignificant25, precisely matching patterns in short-run effects for
EMEs under intermediate pegs, thereby supportive of potentially non-linear
policy trade-offs between exchange rate stability and monetary autonomy.
Given the high rate of short-run pass-through among Advanced Economies,
it is plausible that base country monetary policy spillovers occur rather
quickly and to their full extent among these countries. The significant long-
run adjustment among Emerging Markets at least in part, may explain their
relatively weak and imperfect short run pass-through, suggesting that across
Emerging Markets, the monetary spillover from base countries may take
longer. These results are consistent with the fact that Emerging Markets
are considerably less financialized and host to generally weaker institutions
- both factors potentially inducing greater financial market frictions - com-
pared to their Advanced Economy counterparts.
10 Non-linear Trilemma Trade-offs
In this section we further explore monetary policy pass-through under in-
termediate peg intensities - an area which has received limited attention in
the literature. First I test for any cursory evidence of non-linear monetary
spillovers based on thresholding the exchange rate peg intensity, Wˆ bit (Hansen,
2000[35]). I use the 2-quarter rolling average peg intensities, Wˆ bit (RA, 2),
as they offer good compromise in smoothing out outliers without generating
excessive persistence. I modify Equation 5 by allowing for a threshold effect
for U.S. monetary policy pass-through, thereby allowing γUS to vary in a
discrete fashion depending on whether peg intensity is above or below some
value.
25This result is not reported in Table 1.
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Figure 9 plots the (robust) t-statistics for the additional monetary pass-
through under a peg intensity that is equal to or greater than the value
denoted on the x-axis. For Advanced Economies, there is stark evidence
of potential non-linear spillovers from the U.S., where weak/moderate de
facto pegs (intensities less than approximately 0.40) can enjoy similar mon-
etary independence as pure floats, implied by the statistically insignificant
t-statistics. But moderate/stronger pegs (intensities greater than 0.50 and
less than 0.80) experience significant interest rate pass-through. Intensities
greater than 0.8, strongly managed pegs and fixed exchange rates, have larger
stronger t-statistics. Patterns are similar but slightly weaker among Emerg-
ing Markets. Past an intensity of 0.50, t-statistics on the threshold effect
hover around the 10% significance level, and remain so across greater thresh-
olds. Testing thresholds below 0.50, statistics are unanimously statistically
insignificant, suggesting not much difference between monetary independence
under a pure float or some stability.
To further investigate any potential non-linearity in monetary policy
spillovers under varying peg intensity, we relax the linear-implied specifi-
cation of the baseline regression (Equation 5) and estimate separate sub-
samples, sorting by peg intensity. Again, using the 2-quarter rolling average
peg intensities, Wˆ bit (RA, 2). Country-quarter observations are sorted into
the following 6 bins (Table 2).
Table 2: Peg Intensities by Bin
Pure Float Hard Peg
1 2 3 4 5 6
W bit [0,0.1] (0.1,.30] (0.30,.50] (0.50,0.70] (0.70,0.90] (0.90,1]
The regression specification must be modified due to the more limited
number of observations per sub-sample after dividing the data into 6 separate
groups. Moreover, I only consider peg intensities to one base country at a
time, starting with the U.S (Results for E.U. shocks can be found in Table
12). Constructing bins which condition both on U.S. and E.U. peg intensity
would lead to too few observations per group26. The regression takes the
following form:
26One could take Equation 5 and interact Zˆb with binned peg intensities, which would
potentially allow for both U.S. and E.U. to be jointly tested for non-linear pass-through.
However, this comes at the cost of constraining all other regression coefficients to be pooled
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∆Rit = αi+θ1∆yit+θ2∆πit+θ3∆RERit+θ4∆V IXt+θ5∆R¯t+γUS[ZˆUS,t×Kit]+ǫit.
(7)
There are two key differences between Equation 7 and the previous spec-
ification, Equation 5. The first is that the lagged dependent variable is
removed from the RHS. This is due to data limitations - by constructing
sub-groups using more refined exchange rate regime categories, each group
will not have sufficient data along the time dimension to reduce the bias that
a fixed effects dynamic panel specification generates. Moreover, each obser-
vation is now increasingly valuable for statistical power, and therefore lost
observations from including a lagged dependent variable becomes costly for
inference. On a positive note, since the regression specification is in interest
rate changes the data is not persistent, thereby excluding a lagged dependent
variable will not influence the results in a meaningful way27.
The second change is related to peg intensity. First, I only consider
U.S. monetary policy spillovers, so the variable capturing shocks from the
E.U. is removed. Second, peg intensity, WˆUSit is removed from the trio of
interactions. This is simply because now we condition the entire sample on
WˆUSit by estimating separate regressions per intensity bin. By conditioning
the entire sample, we allow all coefficients to be heterogeneous across peg
intensity bins, lending to more realistic and flexible inference, and addressing
some of the limitations mentioned previously over the original specification.
10.1 All Countries
Table 9 reports spillover estimates from U.S. monetary policy across bins
(˙US), but also reports coefficients on domestic inflation (∆πit), output growth
(∆yit) targets along with effects transmitted through the Global Financial
Cycle (∆V IXit) to capture external drivers of policy interest rates. This
way we can infer whether monetary spillovers are non-linear in peg intensity,
but also if greater monetary autonomy indeed translates to greater weights
on domestic variables. The fourth row reports the spillover coefficients given
by γˆUS, and as the Trilemma implies, the coefficients roughly increase with
together across the entire sample. Because policy weights can vary across countries which
peg or don’t peg, It’s crucial to allow for coefficient flexibility, something that can be
achieved by estimating on sub-samples. Results from this approach are reported in Table
12 and are broadly consistent with other specifications.
27If the regression was estimated in levels, removing the lagged dependent variable would
very likely have a major impact on coefficient estimates.
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peg intensity, with hard pegs having the largest spillover coefficients (0.48).
However, there is evidence of potential non-linearity in spillovers based on
peg intensities. Under weak to moderate peg intensities ranging from 0.1 to
0.5 (bin 2 and 3), evidence of monetary spillovers is statistically indifferent
from zero - the same as if under a fully floating policy. Evidence of monetary
spillovers begin to manifest under more rigid exchange rate policy (bins 4
to 6, peg intensities from 0.5 to 1). Moreover, moderately strong pegs (bin
4 and 5) exhibit weaker monetary pass-through from the U.S.compared to
hard pegs (bin 6), 0.27 and 0.20 versus 0.48, respectively. This evidence has
policy implications, as it suggests that a little bit of exchange rate flexibility
can potentially buy a considerable degree of monetary autonomy, and that
some exchange rate stability can be bought without sacrificing monetary au-
tonomy. Hence, the policy Trilemma trade-off appears to be non-linear in
the data, which differs from findings of Aizenman et al. (2010)[2] and Ito
and Kawai (2014)[39].
Moreover, coefficients on inflation tend to remain highly significant even
under weak to moderate peg intensity (bins 2 and 3) and are approximately
7 times larger than under a hard peg (bin 6), suggesting that the gains from
monetary autonomy are associated with greater emphasis on targeting do-
mestic policy objectives, particularly inflation, The evidence suggests that
pure floating is not necessary to achieve these gains. There is also some evi-
dence that under a both floating and fixed exchange rates, and a particular
intermediate pegs (bins 1,2 and 5,6), monetary policy is increasingly influ-
enced by global financial conditions proxied by changes in the VIX index.
Under a flexible (fixed) exchange rate, interest rate changes tend to respond
positively (negatively) to changes in the VIX. Because U.S. monetary policy
tends to ease in the presence of heightened risk, pegged monetary policy also
falling when the VIX rises is consistent with the Trilemma. Under floating
exchange rates, interest rates tend to rise - this is shown to be driven by the
Emerging Markets sub-sample, who tend to exhibit interest rates which rise,
instead of fall, during periods of heightened risk aversion in hopes to stem
capital outflows.
10.2 Advanced Economies
Table 10 reports results across Advanced Economies. Again, monetary policy
pass-through estimates are nearly monotonically increasing in peg intensity.
Hard pegs (bin 6) suggest full pass-through with a coefficient of approxi-
mately 1. A non-linear trade-off between exchange rate regime and monetary
autonomy is present among the Advanced Economy sub-sample. A moder-
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ate to strong peg (bins 4 and 5) have spillover estimates of 0.43 and 0.62,
respectively, suggesting that giving up a little exchange rate stability can
cut monetary spillovers by 50%. Weaker pegs (bins 2 and 3) suggest even
greater gains in monetary autonomy which are not statistically different than
monetary autonomy under a floating exchange rate. The evidence suggests
that a country which floats it’s exchange rate can administer stabilization
with little cost in monetary independence, while a country running a hard
peg can give up a little stability to buy a considerable degree of monetary
autonomy.
Across Advanced Economies, there is consistent evidence that intermedi-
ate exchange rate regimes offer countries greater weight allocation to domes-
tic objectives, particularly output growth, but not inflation. Under Floating
and most intermediate exchange rate regimes, output growth has a significant
coefficient (bins 1, 3, 4 and 5) which is not present under a hard peg. Ev-
idence that global financial conditions have strong influence over Advanced
Economy interest rates is weak (mostly insignificant coefficient estimates on
∆V IXit). Taking this point together with the results on domestic policy ob-
jectives, it appears that for Advanced economies, flexibility allows countries
to focus on domestic objectives without surrendering autonomy to global
financial forces.
10.3 Emerging Markets
Table 11 reports results for Emerging Markets and I also report estimates on
real exchange rates (∆RERit) for this sub-sample because of its importance
as a policy target (Aizenman et al., 2011[5]). Across the Emerging Market
sample under hard Pegs there is significant evidence of U.S. monetary pass-
through, through imperfect (coefficient of 0.367). Consistent with hard pegs
to the U.S. Dollar, changes in the VIX index are associated with interest rate
cuts among hard pegging Emerging Markets. In addition, these countries ex-
hibit the strongest evidence of responding to real exchange rate changes with
interest rate policy (Fear of Floating, Calvo and Reinhart, 2002[12]).
Like their Advanced Economy counterparts, across bins monetary policy
pass-through appears non-linear in exchange rate peg intensity. Moving from
a hard peg (bin 6) to a moderately strong peg (bin 5) can reduce on aver-
age, interest rate pass-through by two-thirds (from 0.37 to 0.13). Even more
striking, is that bins 2 through 4 all show no evidence of significant monetary
pass-through. That is, light pegs (bin 2) and even moderate pegs (bins 3 and
4), on average, afford as much monetary autonomy as a free floating exchange
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rate (bin 1). It’s important, however to disclose that Emerging Markets are
highly heterogeneous in their characteristics - reflected in the large standard
errors among some of the effect estimates.
Moderate pegs (bins 2 and 3) appear to put as much weight on target-
ing inflation as free floating Emerging Markets (bin 1) and about 7 times
as much weight compared under a hard peg (bin 6). However, contrasting
with Advanced Economies, there is evidence of global financial conditions
significantly impacting the monetary policy of Emerging markets under free
floats or moderate floats (bins 1 and 2). Therefore, flexible exchange rates
in Emerging Markets may be double-edged: while it buys monetary auton-
omy and greater allocation to domestic objectives, policy choices will also
be influenced by global factors (Agrippino and Rey, 2015[50]). The sweet
spot seemingly lies in the intermediate range - U.S. peg intensities between
0.30 and 0.5, where policy rates are able to adjust to domestic inflation, while
buying a significant degree of monetary policy autonomy and insulation from
global financial shocks.
Figure 5: U.S. spillover estimates γˆUS by Peg In-
tensity
Peg intensity of 1 corresponds to pure float. Peg intensity of 6 corresponds to hard peg
vis-a-vis the USD. Estimates of γˆUS from Equation 7. Dark-shaded bars are statistically
significant at the 10% level.
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10.4 Discussion
Digging deeper with more refined exchange rate regime classifications, evi-
dence points to non-linear Trilemma trade-off between monetary autonomy
and exchange rate stability - in both Advanced and Emerging countries.
Weak and Moderate pegs can provide more stability than floating exchange
rates with just as much monetary independence. Even moving from a hard
peg to one that is strongly managed appears to reduce disproportionately the
degree of monetary policy pass-through a country is exposed to. Among Ad-
vanced Economies, greater monetary autonomy bought with exchange rate
flexibility is associated with stronger weights on domestic policy objectives
(output growth), with no evidence of a global financial cycle effect on mon-
etary policy. For Emerging Markets, exchange rate flexibility and greater
monetary autonomy translates to heavier emphasis on inflation as a domes-
tic policy target. Global financial cycle effects on monetary policy are present
under both floating/near-floating and near-hard/hard peg regimes in Emerg-
ing Markets, therefore mid-intensity pegs appear to offer the best trade-off
for this group of economies in terms of monetary independence and exchange
rate stability.
10.5 The Role of International Reserves
I explore two possible mechanisms which could result in a non-linear trade
off between exchange rate stability and monetary independence. The first
of these is the role of reserves accumulation as an additional policy tool.
The potential for foreign exchange interventions to allow a country to violate
the Trilemma constraint has been discussed in the literature. Obstfeld et
al. (2010)[55] argue that the demand for reserves is crucially motivated by
the objective of financial stability amid increased financial integration. Em-
pirically, they find that countries under soft pegs tend to hold significantly
greater levels of reserves28. These countries may wish to actively intervene
in exchange markets to prevent external financial shocks from causing large
exchange rate devaluations. Aizenmen et al. (2010)[2] document the trend
of several Emerging Markets choosing to target intermediate levels of ex-
change rate stability and financial openness while maintaining high levels of
exchange rate stability, thereby violating the Trilemma. These countries also
tend to hold sizable levels of international reserves. Steiner (2017)[58] and
Angrick (2018)[7] also report evidence suggesting that the policy Trilemma
28the effect of a hard peg was found not to be statistically significant, but economically
significant and quantitatively similar to that under a soft peg.
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constraint can be relaxed with active reserves management.
Using international reserves to relax the policy Trilemma constraints
could apply whether in both the case where UIP holds or does not. If UIP
holds, a country may choose to intervene in foreign exchange markets as
an alternative way to stabilize the exchange rate rather than altering the
interest rate directly. Specifically, sterilized interventions would, in theory,
achieve exchange rate stability without changing the money supply. On the
other hand, unsterilized interventions would alter the money supply, but with
a lag, and therefore unsterilized interventions can also grant exchange rate
stability with monetary independence - in the short-run. If UIP fails to hold
(as it seems to empirically) then that itself causes the Trilemma constraints
to break down. In this situation, matching the monetary policy of the base
country may simply not be sufficient to maintain the desired level of exchange
rate stability, with direct intervention being more effective.
To investigate the role of reserves, I test whether the accumulation and
reduction of foreign exchange reserves are associated with base country mon-
etary policy changes. To do this, I simply replace the dependent variable of
the baseline equation (Equation 5) with changes in international reserves:
∆IRit = αi + φ1∆IRi,t−1 + φ2∆yit + φ3∆πit + φ4∆RERit
+ φ5∆V IXt + φ6∆R¯t
+ γUS[ZˆUS,t × Wˆ
$
it ×Kit] + γEU [ZˆEU,t × Wˆ
e
it ×Kit] + ǫit, (8)
where ∆IRit is the log change in international reserves (excluding gold)
of country i in quarter t. Data on international reserves is taken from the
IMF International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity database.
A negative coefficient on γˆb suggests that a reduction in reserves is asso-
ciated with a positive shock to the foreign interest rate, and this reduction
strengthens in the degree of exchange rate rigidity. Under a rigid exchange
rate regime, a higher foreign interest rate, without a reciprocated change in
the local country interest rate, would cause capital outflows. However, this
could be mitigated without an interest rate change (i.e. preserving monetary
independence) if the central bank steps in by selling reserves to maintain
exchange rate stability.
Table 3 reports coefficient estimates. The first two rows consider the full
spectrum of exchange rate flexibility including pure float and pure pegs (1,926
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Table 3: International Reserves and Monetary
Spillovers
Dep. Variable All Advanced Emerging
∆IRit Countries Economies Markets
γˆUS -2.00** -0.787 -3.296***
(0.815) (1.445) (1.033)
γˆEU 1.400 0.456 1.923
(3.630) (6.723) ( 2.102)
γˆUS, Wˆ
US
it ∈ (0, 1) -2.079** -1.434 -4.117***
( 0.958) (1.344) (1.303)
γˆEU , Wˆ
EU
it ∈ (0, 1) -1.344 -3.001 0.949
(5.065) (7.268) (4.162)
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at the Country level. Estimation period: Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Peg
intensity used: Wˆ b
it
(RA, 2).
full sample observations) while the second two rows are considering only inter-
mediate exchange rate regimes (Wˆ bit ∈ (0, 1)) (1,330 full sample observations)
to assure that the results aren’t driven by corner policies. Reserves seem to
be more sensitive to U.S. shocks than E.U. shocks, with the latter not sta-
tistically significant across sub-samples. The significant negative coefficients
on U.S. monetary shocks suggest that countries tend to reduce international
reserves in response to a U.S. tightening, possibly to stabilize the exchange
rate and prevent excessive depreciation. This effect strengthens in peg inten-
sity, and is particularly significant among Emerging Markets, consistent with
previous studies. The effects become more pronounced when considering the
sub-sample of intermediate exchange rate regimes, with E.U. shocks turn-
ing negative and economically significant (but not statistically significant)
for Advanced Economies. For Emerging Markets under intermediate pegs to
the U.S. Dollar, a coefficient of -4.12 implies that under a strongly managed
peg (peg intensity of 0.80), a 1 percentage point U.S. interest rate shock is
associated with a reduction of international reserves equal to [+1% x -4.12 x
0.80] = -3.2%.
The significant response of international reserves to monetary shocks in
Emerging Markets, which is particularly strong under intermediate exchange
rate regimes, provides some evidence supporting their role in mitigating the
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policy Trilemma, thereby enabling a non-linear trade off between exchange
rate stability and monetary autonomy.
10.6 Limits to International Arbitrage
A second mechanism that may produce a non-linear trade off between mon-
etary autonomy and exchange rate stability is if there exists costly frictions
which inhibit the free flow of capital (e.g. transaction costs, intermediation
fees, illiquidity), thereby violating the UIP condition (Fama, 1984[19], Engel,
1996[17], Bansal and Dahlquist, 2000[8]). In the presence of such frictions,
interest rate differentials between two pegged countries can persist, only to
be arbitraged when the differential widens enough to compensate the investor
for the associated costs. This suggests that monetary policy spillovers should
not just be an increasing function in a) financial openness and b) exchange
rate rigidity, but also the c) interest rate differential between the base coun-
try and country i. in other words, when the interest rate differential is small,
country i has more monetary autonomy, therefore the pass-through of a U.S.
monetary policy shock should be smaller, than when the interest rate differ-
ential is large (all else fixed).
I test for evidence consistent with this hypothesis with a simple extension
to the baseline regression (Equation 5):
∆rit = αi + φ1∆ri,t−1 + φ2∆yit + φ3∆πit + φ4∆RERit
+ φ5∆V IXt + φ6∆R¯t
+γUS[ZˆUS,t×Wˆ
$
it×Kit×|ri,t−1−rUS,t−1|]+γEU [ZˆEU,t×Wˆ
e
it×Kit×|ri,t−1−rEU,t−1|]+ǫit,
(9)
where the monetary policy shock instrument [ZˆUS,t×Wˆ
b
it×Kit] is further
interacted with the absolute lagged interest rate differential, |ri,t−1 − rb,t−1|.
Under this specification, a positive estimate on γˆb implies that for a given
degree of exchange rate flexibility and financial openness, monetary policy
spillovers will be larger when interest rate differentials are wider.
Table 4 reports estimates of γˆb, testing whether the interest rate differ-
ential influences monetary policy transmission. While broadly, coefficient
estimates are positive (consistent with limits to arbitrage), statistical signifi-
cance varies. The strongest evidence supporting limits to arbitrage is present
in Advanced Economies targeting the Euro (estimtae of 0.317), and this ef-
fect is robust for the sub-sample of intermediate pegs (estimate of 0.291).
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Table 4: International Arbitrage and Monetary
Spillovers
Dep. Variable All Advanced Emerging
∆rit Countries Economies Markets
γˆUS 0.042*** 0.182 0.0419***
(0.006) (0.161) (0.007)
γˆEU 0.004 0.317** -0.047
(0.054) (0.131) ( 0.060)
γˆUS, Wˆ
US
it ∈ (0, 1) 0.013 0.208 -0.007
( 0.029) (0.164) (0.026)
γˆEU , Wˆ
EU
it ∈ (0, 1) 0.150** 0.291** 0.108
(0.070) (0.130) (0.084)
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at the Country level. Estimation period: Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Peg
intensity used: Wˆ b
it
(RA, 2).
A significant effect of interest rate differentials on monetary pass through
is also seen in Emerging Markets targeting the USD, however, this effect is
driven by corner policies (namely Emerging Markets under floating exchange
rate regimes).
The non-linearities in the trade-off between monetary independence and
exchange rate flexibility are specifically documented with regards to U.S.
monetary policy spillovers. With this in mind, note that this evidence is
generally not supporting the limits to arbitrage mechanism playing a role
in the non-linear Trilemma trade-off that is observed (for U.S. spillovers).
Comparing the two mechanisms, the data suggests that the use of interna-
tional reserves, especially in Emerging Markets, may be an import factor
enabling countries to ’lean against’ the Trilemma constraint (Aizenman et
al., 2010[2]), thereby achieving exchange rate stability, but not necessarily at
the cost of losing monetary autonomy.
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11 Alternative Measures of Exchange Rate
Flexibility
To stress test the results on non-linear monetary policy transmission, I take
the Ilzetzki, Reinhart, Rogoff (2019)[37] (IRR) de facto fine exchange rate
regime classifications to validate whether the non-linear results found in the
previous sections generally hold under a different data classification. For this
exercise, I only consider U.S. shocks rather than both U.S. and E.U. shocks
since the construction of the IRR data doesn’t consider de facto basket an-
chors. The IRR exchange rate regime data, which are monthly, are aggre-
gated to quarterly averages. There are five levels: Floating, Weak Managed
Float, Moderate Managed Float, Strong Managed Float, and Fixed. Denote
them: 1, 2, 3 and 4 and 5, respectively. The original IRR fine classifica-
tion contains 15 different regimes. I consolidate levels 2 through 13 into the
respective bins described below:
Table 5: Consolidating IRR (2019)[37] Fine Clas-
sifications
IRR (2019) To
13 1 (Float)
11, 12 2 (Weak Managed)
9, 10 3 (Moderate Managed)
6, 7, 8 4 (Strong Managed)
2, 3, 4, 5 5 (Peg)
IRR level 1, 14 and 15 are omitted. They cor-
respond to, respectively: 1: no legal tender, 14:
collapsing currency, 15: dual market with missing
data.
The regression specification used is the same as Equation 5, but with only
U.S. shocks, and now the discrete IRR exchange rate regimes:
∆Rit = αi + φ1∆Ri,t−1 + φ2∆yit + φ3∆πit + φ4∆RERit
+ φ5∆V IXt + φ6∆R¯t
+ γUS(IRR)[ZˆUS,t ×D(IRR)
$
it ×Kit] + ǫit. (10)
The coefficient γˆUS(IRR) represents the spillover coefficients across the
five different IRR exchange rate regime classifications. If the estimates are
35
not significantly and/or monotonically increasing in exchange rate rigidity,
the story of non-linear monetary spillovers remains consistent with the pri-
mary analysis.
Table 13 reports estimates of γˆUS(IRR) across all countries, Advanced
Economies, and Emerging Markets. The general pattern persists: under more
rigid exchange rates (4 and 5), there is disproportionately less monetary in-
dependence. The hard peg (bin 5) estimates, interestingly, are statistically
insignificant for Emerging Markets, but highly rigid floats (bin 4) are indeed
significant. Across all three groups of countries, pass-through under free
floating regimes are statistically insignificant, suggesting considerable mone-
tary independence from the U.S.
For Emerging Markets, both bin 2 and bin 4 have significant, positive
pass-throughs, suggesting that under both weak and strong managed floats
there is some evidence of monetary pass-through. Similar to the focal set of
tests, the middle-ground appears to offer both exchange rate stability and
greater monetary autonomy (bin 3). Across Advanced Economies, the coef-
ficients across middle ground regimes: Bins 2, 3 and 4, all are statistically
significant ranging from 0.153 to 0.483. This itself implies non-linearity, as
the estimated pass-through under a managed float is statistically significant
despite the absence of a full peg.
To summarize, under a different measure of exchange rate regime, the
results of suggestive non-linearity hold in most cases, where different degrees
of flexibility within intermediate exchange rate regimes indicate dispropor-
tionate gains/losses in monetary autonomy. For Advanced Economies, no
monetary independence appears to be lost when transitioning from a weakly
managed to a strongly managed intermediate exchange rate regime. For
Emerging Economies, the results appear to vary, yet evidence of linearly ris-
ing monetary pass-through as exchange rate rigidity rises is clearly absent.
12 Exogenous U.S. Monetary Policy Shocks
It’s very possible that residual changes in interest rates ZˆUS,t and ZˆEU,t, used
as interest rate ’shocks’ are still containing endogenous movements related
to omitted or unobservable expectations and macroeconomic forces. As an
additional robustness check, I replace ZˆUS,t with identified U.S. monetary
policy shocks, exploiting the movement in Fed Fund futures contracts around
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FOMC announcements (Kuttner, 2001[46])29. The slight alteration to the
baseline regression then yields the following specification:
∆Rit = αi + φ1∆Ri,t−1 + φ2∆yit + φ3∆πit + φ4∆RERit
+ φ5∆V IXt + φ6∆R¯t
+ γUS[FFSUS,t × Wˆ
$
it ×Kit] + γEU [ZˆEU,t × Wˆ
e
it ×Kit] + ǫit. (11)
Notice that the only alteration is that U.S. interest rate residuals ZˆUS,t
are replaced with Fed Fund shocks FFSUS,t. These shocks are computed by
taking the change in the front-month Fed Funds futures contract over the day
of a scheduled FOMC meeting. Then, these daily changes are aggregated to
the quarterly frequency30.
14 reports the baseline spillover estimates, but now with Fed Funds shocks
replacing the U.S. interest rate residual. Consistent with Bluedorn and
Bowdler (2010)[10], estimates across the full sample, Advanced Economies,
and Emerging Markets all suggest γˆUS = 1 within 95% confidence bands,
suggesting approximate 1-for-1 U.S. interest rate pass-through under open
capital flows and a fixed exchange rate. The full country sample and Ad-
vanced Economy sub-sample estimates are statistically significant at the 1%
level (estimates of 0.944 and 1.049, respectively), while the Emerging Mar-
ket estimate of γˆUS using FFSUS,t is statistically significant at the 11% level
(estimate of 0.867). Overall estimates of monetary pass-through under con-
tinuous exchange rate regime measures are robust to using either actual or
unanticipated changes in U.S. monetary policy.
13 Omitting 2008-2010 Global Financial Cri-
sis
I omit Q1 2008 - Q4 2010 and re-estimate the baseline regression (Equation
5) to infer to what degree the Global Financial Crisis may be driving esti-
mates of monetary pass-through. It’s the conventional view that over this
period, global factors were driving synchronized fluctuations in real activity
29Bluedorn and Bowdler (2010)[10] replace changes to U.S. interest rates with these ’Fed
Funds shocks’ to test the Trilemma, reporting highly significant results and near complete
monetary pass-through to pegged countries.
30There is no severe serial correlation generated through aggregation. Unit root tests
on the quarterly FF shock series reject the null of a unite root.
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and financial volatility across countries. Thereby, it may be possible that
correlations between monetary policy of different countries were actually re-
sponding to domestic conditions which happened to be synchronized.
Table 15 reports the results of the baseline tests (Equation 5) after omit-
ting the crisis period, Q1 2008 - Q4 2010. Across all countries, Advanced
Economies, and Emerging markets, the pass-through effects remain robust to
omitting the crisis period. In fact, the pass-through effects on both U.S. and
E.U. coefficients rise in the All Country sample after omitting the crisis pe-
riod (to 0.522 and 0.398, respectively). Across Advanced countries, spillover
estimates remain stable and highly significant. The pass-through coefficient
for Emerging Markets rises considerably (to 0.474) after omitting the crisis
period. The evidence of intermediate exchange rate regimes affecting the
pass-through of monetary policy remains a highly robust feature of the data,
insensitive to the Global Financial Crisis.
14 Conclusion
In this study, I investigate monetary policy spillovers under the Trilemma
with a particular focus on intermediate exchange rates. To overcome the
challenges typically faced exchange rate related research, I suggest a contin-
uous de facto measure of exchange rate regime which considers the entire
spectrum of exchange rate flexibility, thereby loosening the tight assumption
that all middle-ground policies are equal.
Over the sample period of 2000-2018 and across Advanced and Emerg-
ing Markets alike, I document significant evidence of monetary policy pass-
through conditional on greater financial openness and greater exchange rate
rigidity. The extent of monetary pass-through from the U.S and E.U. 1)
is broadly significant, but stronger for Advanced Economies, 2) occurs over
both the short-run and longer-run, 3) varies within intermediate exchange
rate regimes, 4) appears to be diversifiable under a basket peg, and 5) is
non-linear in exchange rate flexibility. These results are generally robust to
using different definitions of exchange rate flexibility and whether monetary
spillovers are measured with actual interest rate changes or unanticipated
shocks. The results are not driven by the Global Financial Crisis period.
The latter three points suggest that the intensive margin of exchange rate
regimes matter - peg intensity influences monetary pass-through even upon
moving away from corner policy choices. Moreover, monetary autonomy
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is non-linear in exchange rate flexibility. When facing U.S. monetary policy
shocks in particular, intermediate exchange rate regimes are not all the same:
near-corner policies can carry starkly different implications from corner poli-
cies themselves. In both Advanced Economies and Emerging Markets, the
evidence suggests that countries can achieve almost the same monetary au-
tonomy as a float without resorting to a pure float. Countries can also gain
disproportionate monetary independence by sacrificing a relatively little ex-
change rate stability.
Two possible mechanisms which enable non-linear Trilemma trade offs
are explored: The role of international reserves and limits to international
arbitrage. The data supports the former, as I find countries tend to sig-
nificantly expend international reserves in response to U.S. monetary policy
shocks, and the reduction is larger under greater exchange rate rigidity, and
more pronounced for intermediate pegs. Managing reserves to stabilize the
exchange rate without necessarily losing monetary autonomy allows countries
to ’lean against’ the Trilemma constraint. The effects are particularly pro-
nounced among Emerging Markets- the group of countries exhibiting more
non-linearity between the Trilemma trade offs. I also test whether costly
arbitrage may weaken monetary spillovers when interest rate differentials are
sufficiently small. The evidence supporting this mechanism is relatively weak.
Such gains in monetary autonomy are allocated differently across Ad-
vanced Economies and Emerging Markets. Advanced Economies tend to put
greater emphasis on output stabilization while Emerging Markets focus on
inflation. However, Emerging Market monetary policy also becomes increas-
ingly vulnerable global financial shocks as they move towards more flexible
exchange rates.
The fact that the Two-Corners hypothesis has been continuously rejected,
combined with the scarcity of pure floats, suggests that the de facto dom-
inance of intermediate exchange rate regimes is here to stay. This paper’s
findings, specifically those suggesting a non-linear Trilemma trade-off con-
cerning monetary independence, may provide one possible explanation as to
why the majority of countries consistently choose middle-ground exchange
rate policies.
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15 Appendix: Data Detail
Quarterly central bank policy interest rates are taken from the BIS and IMF
IFS databases. Additional data on interest rates were collected from individ-
ual central bank websites and Global Financial Data. When official central
bank policy rates could not be used, short-term treasury bills, repos, or dis-
count rates are used.
Inflation and CPI data is primarily drawn from the BIS, IMF IFS, and the
World Bank. For country-quarter observations where data was not available,
annual inflation rates (divided by four) were used for imputation. Inflation is
year-over-year. Nominal GDP data is from the IMF IFS database. Growth
rates are computed as year-over-year. Missing observations were filled in us-
ing annual frequency growth rates from the World Bank.
Daily exchange rate data is taken from the BIS and are used to estimate
de-facto exchange rate peg intensity. Moreover, daily log returns are aggre-
gated to the quarterly frequency, and combined with inflation data to derive
quarterly real exchange rate returns. A positive change in the real exchange
rate corresponds to local depreciation.
Annual capital controls measures are from the Chinn-Ito index and re-
peated over each quarter within the year, derived from the IMF AREAER.
For Serbia, capital control measurements are taken from the Wang-Jahan
index, which is also derived from the IMF AREAR index. Remaining miss-
ing values for Serbia are extrapolated (2000-2004, and 2014-2018). Since the
index is updated through 2017, I extrapolate 2017 values to 2018. Developed
and Emerging/Developing Economy classifications are taken from IMFWEO
(2019).
Data on foreign exchange reserves are taken from the IMF International
Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity database. International reserves
are measured as the sum of total foreign currency reserves, IMF reserve po-
sitions and SDRs. Gold holdings are excluded from calculation.
For robustness, additional tests are run using alternative definitions of
exchange rate regime. Specifically, I use the Ilzetzki, Reinhart, Rogoff (2017)
data set on de-facto exchange rate regimes (coarse classification), which has
14 classes of flexibility which I consolidate into a smaller set. IRR exchange
rate regime only thorough Q 4 2016. I take quarterly averages of monthly
exchange rate regimes.
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Fed Fund Futures data are taken from Bloomberg. 1st contract month
yield changes are computed over the day of a scheduled FOMC meeting.
Daily monetary policy shocks are then aggregated to the quarterly level (sim-
ple sum).
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16 Appendix: Main
46
Figure 6: Change in Peg Intensity from 2000 to
2018 by currency
47
Figure 7: Peg intensities over time, selected coun-
tries
48
Figure 8: Peg intensities over time, cross-country
average
49
Figure 9: Threshold Testing for Non-Linear
Spillover Effects, Advanced and Emerging Markets
Reporting robust t-statistics from regression (Equation 5 with a threshold indicator on
de facto peg intensity, WˆUS
it
, RA(2)). X-axis denotes the threshold. Dashed horizontal
line denotes t-statistic of 1.65 (10% significance).
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Table 6: Baseline Regression Results:
All Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wˆ bit Wˆ
b
it (RA, 2) Wˆ
b
it (RA, 4) Wˆ
b
it (RA, 2) Wˆ
b
it (RA, 2)
∈ (0, 1)
γˆUS 0.351***
(0.108)
γˆEU 0.497***
(0.124)
γˆUS 0.348*** 0.442*** 0.378**
(0.125) (0.168) (0.154)
γˆEU 0.467*** 0.285* 0.667***
(0.135) (0.17) (0.124)
γˆUS 0.362**
(0.148)
γˆEU 0.538***
(0.183)
Adj. R2 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.15
F-Statistic 69.38 58.06 46.05 46.86 43.96
N×T 2,882 2,532 1,937 2,532 1,727
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE N N N Y N
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification of Equation 5. Estimation
period: Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Column 5 estimates on the sub-sample of intermediate pegs
(peg intensities between 0 and 1, for both U.S. and E.U.
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Table 7: Baseline Regression Results:
Advanced Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wˆ bit Wˆ
b
it (RA, 2) Wˆ
b
it (RA, 4) Wˆ
b
it (RA, 2) Wˆ
b
it (RA, 2)
∈ (0, 1)
γˆUS 0.656***
(0.213)
γˆEU 0.799***
(0.071)
γˆUS 0.742*** 0.701*** 0.737***
(0.209) (0.198) (0.178)
γˆEU 0.759*** 0.422*** 0.663***
(0.117) (0.121) (0.088)
γˆUS 0.797***
(0.220)
γˆEU 0.700***
(0.131)
Adj. R2 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.186 0.40
F-Statistic 70.40 62.91 46.60 39.59 40.04
N×T 746 644 486 644 444
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE N N N Y N
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification of Equation 5. Estimation
period Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Advanced Economies sub-sample only. .
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Table 8: Baseline Regression Results:
Emerging Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wˆ bit Wˆ
b
it (RA, 2) Wˆ
b
it (RA, 4) Wˆ
b
it (RA, 2) Wˆ
b
it (RA, 2)
∈ (0, 1)
γˆUS 0.266**
(0.108)
γˆEU 0.176
( 0.165)
γˆUS 0.238* 0.387** 0.119
(0.127) (0.181) (0.154)
γˆEU 0.145 -0.001 0.761***
(0.182) (0.209) (0.288)
γˆUS 0.213
(0.153)
γˆEU 0.366
( 0.327)
Adj. R2 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.13
F-Statistic 46.05 38.85 30.36 32.01 29.49
N×T 2,135 1,887 1,451 1,887 1,282
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE N N N Y N
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification of Equation 5. Estimation
period Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Emerging Markets sub-sample only. .
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Table 9: Spillover Effects across Peg Intensity Bins:
All Countries
Bin 1 2 3 4 5 6
WˆUSit (RA, 2) [0,0.1] (0.1,.30] (0.30,.50] (0.50,0.70] (0.70,0.90] (0.90,1]
∆πit 0.094*** 0.115*** 0.092*** 0.056 0.170*** 0.014*
(0.022) (0.043) (0.015) (0.045) (0.025) (0.007)
∆yit 0.029** 0.014 0.017 0.022 0.004 0.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006)
∆V IXit 0.163** 0.303** -0.009 0.157 0.174* -0.138**
(0.068) (0.118) (0.064) (0.129) (0.088) (0.060)
γˆUS -0.047 0.006 -0.061 0.274** 0.204*** 0.481***
(0.103) (0.095) (0.271) (0.134) (0.066) (0.132)
F-Statistic 7.19 6.14 10.31 9.23 26.65 9.84
N×T 385 356 409 356 389 684
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification of Equation 7. Estimation
period Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Country Fixed Effects included. .
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Table 10: Spillover Effects across Peg Intensity
Bins:
Advanced Economies
Bin 1 2 3 4 5 6
WˆUSit (RA, 2) [0,0.1] (0.1,.30] (0.30,.50] (0.50,0.70] (0.70,0.90] (0.90,1]
∆πit 0.009 0.115** 0.101** 0.003 -0.099 0.092***
(0.024) (0.047) (0.049) (0.031) (0.068) (0.012)
∆yit 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.009 0.016*** 0.039*** 0.010
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.022)
∆V IXit -0.093 0.062 -0.042 0.132* 0.043 -0.121
(0.069) (0.091) (0.054) (0.066) (0.119) (0.107)
γˆUS 0.060* 0.012 0.137** 0.433*** 0.616*** 1.021***
(0.035) (0.065) (0.057) (0.030) (0.106) (0.115)
F-Statistic 8.71 10.73 2.51 3.05 4.54 19.03
N×T 167 130 100 50 37 84
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification of Equation 7. Estimation
period Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Country Fixed Effects included. Advanced Economy
sub-sample only. .
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Table 11: Spillover Effects across Peg Intensity
Bins:
Emerging Markets
Bin 1 2 3 4 5 6
WˆUSit (RA, 2) [0,0.1] (0.1,.30] (0.30,.50] (0.50,0.70] (0.70,0.90] (0.90,1]
∆πit 0.098*** 0.109** 0.093*** 0.058 0.172*** 0.014**
(0.023) (0.050) (0.016) (0.046) (0.026) (0.007)
∆yit 0.024 0.005 0.018 0.023 0.003 0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.007) (0.006)
∆RERit 0.026 -0.011 0.005 0.021** -0.010 0.040**
(0.018) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018)
∆V IXit 0.285*** 0.441*** 0.007 0.168 0.175* -0.133**
(0.077) (0.152) (0.082) (0.151) (0.098) (0.067)
γˆUS -0.264 0.129 -0.255 0.208 0.131*** 0.367***
(0.270) (0.436) (0.509) (0.180) (0.059) (0.113)
F-Statistic 5.19 3.05 8.02 9.04 25.63 6.42
N×T 218 226 309 306 352 600
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification of Equation 7. Estimation
period Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Country Fixed Effects included. Emerging Market
sub-sample only. .
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Table 12: Spillover Effects across Peg Intensity
Bins:
Pooled Model (Equation 5) with Exchange Rate
Regime Dummies
Bin 1 2 3 4 5 6
WˆUSit (RA, 2) [0,0.1] (0.1,.30] (0.30,.50] (0.50,0.70] (0.70,0.90] (0.90,1]
All Countries
γˆUS -0.049 0.207 -0.206 0.025 0.125* 0.388***
(0.082) (0.166) (0.269) (0.212) (0.064) (0.140)
γˆEU 0.296* 0.177 0.631*** 0.990** -0.066 0.439***
(0.152) (0.236) (0.226) ( 0.395) ( 0.246) (0.124)
Advanced Economies
γˆUS 0.079* 0.098 0.168*** 0.305*** 0.376*** 0.771***
(0.041) (0.104) (0.056) ( 0.066) (0.050) (0.211)
γˆEU 0.444*** 0.303*** 0.399** 1.039*** 0.332*** 0.566***
(0.081) (0.066) (0.171) (0.199) (0.096) (0.085)
Emerging Markets
γˆUS -0.307 0.361 -0.491 -0.067 0.075 0.288**
(0.215) (0.534) (0.496) ( 0.300) (0.073) (0.133)
γˆEU 0.221 0.040 0.771** 0.356 -0.764 0.444**
( 0.206) (0.342) ( 0.356) (1.112) (0.677) (0.180)
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification of Equation 5, using
dummy variables for values of WˆUS
it
(RA, 2). Estimation period Q2 2000 - Q4 2018.
Country Fixed Effects included. .
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Table 13: Spillover Effects across IRR (2019)[37]
Exchange Rate Regimes: Pooled Model (Equation
10) with Exchange Rate Regime Dummies
Floating Fixed
IRR Classification 1 2 3 4 5
All Countries
γˆUS(IRR) 0.214 0.483*** 0.153** 0.220** 0.177
(0.155) (0.162) (0.074) (0.087) (1.772)
Advanced Economies
γˆUS(IRR) 0.491 0.265*** 0.341*** 0.219*** 2.374***
( 0.304) ( 0.074) (0.050) ( 0.076) (0.197)
Emerging Markets
γˆUS(IRR) 0.076 0.868*** 0.069 0.358*** -0.513
(0.155) (0.274) (0.104) (0.129) (2.309)
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at the Country level. Estimation period Q2 2000 - Q4 2016. Country
Fixed Effects included. .
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Table 14: FOMC Monetary Policy Shocks
(1) (2) (3)
All Advanced Emerging
Countries Economies Markets
γˆUS 0.944**
(0.392)
γˆEU 0.535***
(0.128)
γˆUS 1.049***
(0.281)
γˆEU 0.817***
(0.117)
γˆUS 0.867
(0.534)
γˆEU 0.239
(0.168)
Adj. R2 0.12 0.33 0.13
F-Statistic 42.88 42.61 38.88
N×T 2,120 644 1,887
Country FE Y Y Y
Time FE N N N
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification of Equation 5. Estimation
period: Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Peg intensity estimate used is Wˆ b
it
RA(2). FOMC monetary
policy shocks are implied yield changes from front month Fed Funds Futures contracts
over the day of an FOMC announcement. Changes are aggregated to quarterly frequency.
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Table 15: Omitting the 2008 Global Financial Cri-
sis
(1) (2) (3)
All Advanced Emerging
Countries Economies Markets
γˆUS 0.522***
(0.127)
γˆEU 0.398***
(0.152)
γˆUS 0.616***
(0.121)
γˆEU 0.575***
(0.102)
γˆUS 0.474***
(0.166)
γˆEU 0.183
(0.343)
Adj. R2 0.12 0.39 0.11
F-Statistic 42.88 44.78 28.91
N×T 2,120 539 1,580
Country FE Y Y Y
Time FE N N N
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Robust standard
errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification of Equation 5. Estimation
period: Q2 2000 - Q4 2018 but omitting crisis window of Q1 2008 - Q4 2010. Peg
intensity estimate used is Wˆ b
it
RA(2).
60
T
ab
le
16:
P
eg
In
ten
sities
to
B
ase
C
u
rren
cies
# Country/FX USD (2000) USD (2018) EUR (2000) EUR (2018) JPY (2000) JPY (2018)
1 AED 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 ALL 0.30 0.75 0.09 0.84 0.00 0.08
3 ARS 0.96 0.50 0.03 0.58 0.02 0.16
4 AUD 0.22 0.09 0.30 0.65 0.22 0.05
5 BGN 0.04 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.00
6 BHD 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 BND 0.74 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.07
8 BRL 0.99 0.25 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.51
9 CAD 0.69 0.17 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.00
10 CHF 0.13 0.07 0.88 0.52 0.03 0.24
11 CLP 0.68 0.42 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.12
12 CNY 1.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 COP 0.50 0.30 0.00 0.21 0.09 0.18
14 CZK 0.08 0.00 0.76 0.79 0.04 0.00
15 DKK 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.98 0.00 0.00
16 DZD 0.27 0.45 0.63 0.27 0.06 0.00
17 GBP 0.09 0.00 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.01
18 HKD 0.96 0.93 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00
19 HRK 0.00 0.01 0.98 0.98 0.02 0.00
20 HUF 0.06 0.00 0.99 0.90 0.00 0.01
21 IDR 0.50 0.29 0.24 0.30 0.32 0.00
22 ILS 0.95 0.37 0.06 0.42 0.04 0.08
23 INR 0.92 0.49 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.01
24 ISK 0.25 0.11 0.45 0.26 0.00 0.18
25 KRW 0.96 0.05 0.02 0.17 0.19 0.05
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(co
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# Country/FX USD (2000) USD (2018) EUR (2000) EUR (2018) JPY (2000) JPY (2018)
26 KWD 0.85 0.82 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02
27 LKR 0.87 0.74 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.06
28 MKD 0.39 0.25 0.15 0.05 0.01 0.08
29 MXN 0.98 0.27 0.14 0.53 0.09 0.23
30 MYR 0.93 0.48 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.01
31 NOK 0.30 0.00 0.74 0.47 0.09 0.01
32 NPR 0.99 0.82 0.06 0.41 0.01 0.18
33 NZD 0.32 0.16 0.31 0.62 0.09 0.10
34 OMR 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
35 PEN 0.95 0.68 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.02
36 PHP 0.83 0.95 0.20 0.32 0.12 0.05
37 PKR 0.87 0.96 0.00 0.24 0.09 0.11
38 PLN 0.34 0.00 0.33 0.94 0.00 0.03
39 QAR 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
40 RON 1.00 0.04 0.11 0.95 0.03 0.03
41 RSD 0.47 0.00 0.14 0.33 0.14 0.13
42 RUB 0.99 0.43 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.00
43 SAR 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
44 SEK 0.20 0.00 0.68 0.44 0.04 0.08
45 SGD 0.73 0.14 0.06 0.17 0.08 0.04
46 THB 0.76 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.02
47 TRY 0.59 0.67 0.44 0.60 0.07 0.00
48 TTD 0.96 0.88 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02
49 TWD 0.92 0.32 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.06
50 UAH 0.96 0.69 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.05
51 UYU 1.00 0.76 0.05 0.33 0.04 0.14
52 ZAR 0.44 0.03 0.39 0.49 0.08 0.26
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